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Article 8

Tainted
FOOD, IDENTITY, AND THE SEARCH FOR
DIGNITARY REDRESS
Melissa Mortazavi†
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following examples: a kosher consumer
buys and eats “all beef franks” that are packaged in pork
casings. A halal person buys and ingests vitamins that contain
pig gelatin, even though no animal products are listed on the
label. A vegetarian consumes undisclosed beef fat. In each of
these situations, the consumer ingests food products that they
find both viscerally disgusting and morally repugnant,
undermining the consumer’s very religious and moral identity. In
each of these cases, the FDA does not require the manufacturer to
disclose the offensive food substance on its labels if the
substance’s content is below the statutory minimum and the
offensive ingredient does not have a health, functionality, or
safety impact. Currently, the law provides redress for exposure to
foods that are toxic and poisonous—tainted as a matter of
physical safety.1 But it provides little redress for exposure to foods
that are tainted otherwise. Should it? If so, what type of law can
or should address this issue?
Discussing the nature of taint, impurity, and offensive
taint specifically, this article seeks to expand discussions of food
safety and security beyond access to any food, to access to food
that is in accordance with an individual’s identity and beliefs.2

† Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma School of Law. My
thanks to Anita Bernstein, Roger Michalski, Kenton Brice, and Lillian V. Smith for their
thoughtful questions, research suggestions, and engagement with this topic. Additional
gratitude to Sarah Warburg-Johnson for her excellent research assistance.
1 See Alexia Brunet Marks, Check Please: Using Legal Liability to Inform
Food Safety Regulation, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 723, 723-25 (2013) (discussing over 300 food
safety cases and related laws and regulations).
2 VANDANA SHIVA, STOLEN HARVEST: THE HIJACKING OF THE GLOBAL FOOD
SUPPLY 21 (2000) (“Food security is not just having access to adequate food. It is also
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Food is more than just fuel to people. Food is intimately
intertwined with self, identity, and personhood. Food choices
can express our religious beliefs, our political views, and our
basic understandings of culture. Thus, “safe” foods can also be
tainted—not in terms of being medically poisonous or toxic—but
because of the religious and social implications associated with
eating them. This article labels such exposure to medically safe
but otherwise impure foods as “offensive taint.”
Some have argued that food oppression occurs when facially
neutral laws have disproportionally adverse health impacts on
minority populations.3 This article argues that facially neutral
laws may also adversely impact minorities’ ability to express their
beliefs and exercise personal autonomy, thereby inflicting
dignitary harm.
For those who might dismiss these hypotheticals as the
result of highly idiosyncratic food preferences, as opposed to
genuine harms that the law should protect against, consider
exposure to foods that are merely viewed as offensive in
American culture.4 What if the aforementioned “all beef” hot
dogs were covered in insect-based casings? The hypothetical
situation is simply an “ick” factor not grounded in any health
claims5—but likely most people in modern U.S. society would
consider the presence of bugs in their food highly offensive,
without any deep religious or political conviction. Most likely,
the average citizen would feel personally and physically
violated by eating food that had those components, regardless
of the food’s safety.6

having access to culturally appropriate food. Vegetarians can starve if asked to live on
meat diets.”).
3 See Andrea Freeman, The 2014 Farm Bill: Farm Subsidies and Food
Oppression, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1276 (2015) (defining food oppression as the
study of “how facially neutral food policy and law can physically debilitate members of
marginalized and subordinated groups”).
4 It is questionable whether law need be applicable to large numbers of
people to be valid. Indeed, much of law is preoccupied with protecting individual
rights—an individual being, by definition, just one person.
5 This is despite there being no health risk necessarily associated with these
choices, and in other countries, people do ingest insects. Insects are becoming
increasingly recognized as an efficient source of high nutritional value. Melanie
Haiken, The Next New Miracle Superfood: Insects, Scientists Say, FORBES (July 11,
2014, 11:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/melaniehaiken/2014/07/11/the-next-newmiracle-superfood-insects-scientists-say [http://perma.cc/8GB5-7AW9] (noting the high
protein and beneficial fat content of insects).
6 This article does not argue that a pure “ick” factor should necessarily be
enough to recover under the law, although it could be. Rather, it uses this example to
make the point that many people find foods highly and viscerally objectionable based
on loose social norms, let alone personal or religious convictions.
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This article is the first to directly identify and confront
this gap in the law. Part I begins by outlining the issue: why
such taint is a real harm deserving of legal compensation and
how it has been raised in previous cases. Part II then discusses
the current state of the law and exposes how such harms are not
adequately protected under existing constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, and common law structures. Finally, Part III
concludes that in lieu of statutory and regulatory reform,
traditional dignitary torts—particularly battery—may provide the
most immediate form of redress for individuals seeking to protect
themselves from unwanted exposure to offensively tainted foods.
This article argues that, in many ways, offensive food taint is a
food justice issue that is about recognizing the failure of law to
provide redress for something that is intuitively fundamental:
the ability to control our dignitary space and physical
autonomy.
I.

WHY OFFENSIVE FOOD TAINT IS A HARM

Food is not just a product. It is central to human
survival, not only because it provides physical nourishment,
but also because it defines who we are as people.7 Food
traditions mark the important moments in human lives:
holidays, weddings, births, deaths. Food choices solidify
nationalism, delineate faiths, and signal political beliefs.8 Food
cultures and traditions dignify group memberships and
individual identity. As such, exposure to food that is repugnant
for reasons other than food safety is a real harm deserving of
legal protection. Courts, however, have failed to consistently
find that someone who has unwittingly come into contact with
food that is offensive to their beliefs has suffered actual injury.
A.

Food, Faith, Identity, Nationhood

The clearest example of food’s unique role in society is its
centrality in expressions of faith. Faiths often define what
7 SIDNEY W. MINTZ, TASTING FOOD, TASTING FREEDOM: EXCURSIONS INTO
EATING, CULTURE, AND THE PAST 7 (1996) (“[E]ating is never a ‘purely biological’
activity . . . . [F]oods eaten have histories associated with the pasts of those who eat them.”).
8 See generally PAMELA GOYAN KITTLER ET AL., FOOD AND CULTURE 4-12 (6th ed.
2012) (discussing the role of ethnicity and culture in food traditions); Peter Smith,
Mythology and the Raw Milk Movement, SMITHSONIAN (May 9, 2012),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/mythology-and-the-raw-milk-movement84299903/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/M57S-4H5K] (discussing how the raw foods movement
views consumption of raw milk to be a manifestation of libertarian political beliefs).
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adherents can and cannot eat. Meat in particular is highly
restricted. Jews have kosher laws that dictate not only that
certain meats are prohibited outright but also how meat that is
not prohibited must be slaughtered and eaten.9 These rules are
detailed and provide that certain foods, such as meat and
dairy, cannot be combined.10 Muslims do not eat pork.11 Out of
a commitment to nonviolence and a belief in reincarnation,
strict Hindus and Buddhists are vegetarian.12 In addition to
rules regarding what can be eaten, abstention from eating also
plays a significant role in religious practice. Catholics, Jews,
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Latter Day Saints all engage
in some form of ritual fasting as a way to cleanse or purify.13
Food is also central to nationalism.14 Whether discussing
wine (and therefore France) or rice (and Japan), foods and
eating practices often represent or symbolize entire countries.15
Nations and cultures take pride in their food traditions. At
times, foods from a country are synonymous with not only the
country itself but also its people; during World War II, the
French were disparagingly referred to as “Frogs” and the
Germans known as “Krauts,” highlighting divergent food
traditions as a way to elicit intuitive dislike or disgust.16
9 TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF
INDUSTRIAL FOOD 7, 40 (Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (discussing kosher rules).
10 Id.
11 PETER SMITH & DAVID WORDEN, KEY BELIEFS, ULTIMATE QUESTIONS AND
LIFE ISSUES 115 (2003) (noting that pork is viewed as dirty in the Islamic faith).
12 Id. at 114 (discussing why Hindus and Buddhists generally abstain from
eating meat).
13 C AROLINE W ALKER B YNUM , H OLY F EAST AND H OLY F AST : T HE
RELIGIOUS S IGNIFICANCE OF FOOD TO MEDIEVAL WOMEN 37 (1987) (discussing the
tradition of Lent and fasting prior to Easter); NATANA DELONG-BAS, THE FIVE PILLARS OF
ISLAM: OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES ONLINE RESEARCH GUIDE 15 (2011) (describing Muslim
fasting during Ramadan); Yom Kippur—Day of Atonement, REFORMJUDAISM.ORG, http://
www.reformjudaism.org/jewish-holidays/yom-kippur-day-atonement [http://perma.cc/7NB
8-JEJN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (discussing fasting during Jewish high holy days);
KITTLER ET AL., supra note 8, at 98 (describing how Hindus fast on several days throughout
the year to coincide with cycles of the lunar calendar, anniversaries of the deaths of parents,
and other key holidays); Elder Joseph B. Wirthlin, The Law of the Fast, LDS.ORG (July
2001), http://www.lds.org/liahona/2001/07/the-law-of-the-fast?lang=eng [http://perma.cc
/UCT4-R7WL] (noting that Latter Day Saints should fast to gain spiritual clarity).
14 ATSUKO ICHIJO & RONALD RANTA, FOOD, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
NATIONALISM: FROM EVERYDAY TO GLOBAL POLITICS 2 (2016) (“[F]ood, or more
precisely food culture, builds and sustains a particular relationship between the
individual and the nation.”).
15 Mark Weiner, Consumer Culture and Participatory Democracy: The Story
of Coca-Cola During WWII, in FOOD IN THE USA: A READER 123 (Carole M. Counihan
ed., 2002) (noting the relationship between wine and France, rice and Japan, and
whiskey and Scotland).
16 See Frog, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY: ONLINE EDITION (2014), http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/frog [http://perma.cc/Y4CU-7UF6] (defining
“Frog” with a capital letter as a derogatory term for the French); Kraut, OXFORD ENG.
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Governments can also use food to foster a stronger sense
of national identity through various actions including “national
branding, standardisation of a ‘national’ cuisine, [and] protection
of the agricultural sector or restriction of trade of certain food
items.”17 Wartime often highlights the nationalism infused in food
traditions when common foods may be rebranded to avoid
associations with the enemy.18 In war, food may also be used to
win over enemy civilians by introducing them to foreign food
that is easy to prepare and thus is easily assimilated into their
existing food cultures.19
A situation need not rise to the level of armed conflict,
however, for food to be used to protect a certain sense of national
identity. Recently, European countries have reaffirmed a
commitment to a non-Muslim national identity by refusing to
accommodate religious needs in state school-meal programs.20 In
a recent vote, a Danish locality’s flexibility with regards to drug
policies contrasted sharply with its adoption of rigid school
meal requirements, declaring that Danish schools and daycares
must include pork meatballs: “‘Danish food culture’ must be a
‘central part of the offering—including serving pork on an equal
footing with other foods.’”21 Such views are not exclusive to the
international realm; anti-Muslim sentiment has also fueled
strong reactions to keeping pork in schools in the United States. 22
DICTIONARY: ONLINE EDITION (2014), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/kraut [http://perma.cc/DRL4-4VAS] (defining “Kraut” as a derogatory
term for a German, especially a German soldier).
17 ICHIJO & RANTA, supra note 14, at 5.
18 See, e.g., Liberty Cabbage, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY: ONLINE EDITION (2014),
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/liberty-cabbage [http://per
ma.cc/26ZV-RUZQ] (defining “liberty cabbage” as an American noun “[a]dopted during
the First World War (1914–18) to avoid the German associations of sauerkraut”); French
Fries Back on House Menu, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/5240572.stm [http://perma.cc/GW5M-E2Q2]. In response to French resistance
to American policy, some legislatures sought to remove the word “French” from house
menus. Reporters likened this to “similar protest action against Germany during World
War I, when sauerkraut was renamed liberty cabbage and frankfurters became hot
dogs.” Id.
19 Recent war efforts continue this trend with Afghan civilians receiving regular
air drops of culturally acceptable (halal) yet Western-style food. See Associated Press, U.S.
Airstrikes also Include Airdrops of Food, Medicine, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Oct. 7, 2001),
http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2001/10/07/wor_324787.shtml [http://perma.cc/CG9
B-4WDC] (noting that the contents of the drops included peanut butter, strawberry
jam, crackers, a fruit pastry, and entrees such as beans with tomato sauce and bean
and potato vinaigrette).
20 Dan Bilefsky, Denmark’s New Front in Debate over Immigrants: Children’s
Lunches, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/europe/
randers-denmark-pork.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/MZ4B-RJ9R].
21 Id.
22 Todd Starnes, Why Did a Tennessee Grade School Ban Pork?, FOX NEWS
RADIO, http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/why-did-a-tennessee-grade-school-ban-
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Likewise, cognizance of a food’s relationship to the
nation-state and nation building has led to the emergence of
“gastro-diplomacy”—the act of attempting to create diplomatic
ties between nations through a deeper relationship with
national food practices.23 The term “gastro-diplomacy” was coined
in 2002 by the Economist when reporting on a Thai government
initiative, called “Global Thai,” which was created to increase the
number of Thai restaurants worldwide.24 The program was
intended not only to introduce Thai food to new populations in an
attempt to increase tourism in Thailand, but also to “subtly help
to deepen relations with other countries.”25 In the years since,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia have all created gastrodiplomacy programs specifically with the goals of increasing
commerce and tourism and diplomatic ties.26 Realizing the
diplomatic potential of such outreach, the U.S. State Department
created the Diplomatic Culinary Partnership in 2012 to
increase cross-cultural diplomacy through food.27 Such official
actions reflect what general citizens know from daily life—
eating together and sharing foods and food experiences can be
intimate and meaningful.28
Food-centered holidays can also create a common sense of
nationalism across different cultures. For example, in the United
States, Thanksgiving has a set of food traditions, in terms of
pork.html [http://perma.cc/55L9-YHZB] (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (discussing backlash against
a public school that distributed a snack list that stated that children should avoid
bringing snacks containing pork).
23 Paul Rockower, The Gastrodiplomacy Cookbook, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-rockower/the-gastrodiplomacy-cookb_b_
716555.html [http://perma.cc/UG36-ZFEJ] (describing gastrodiplomacy as “the act of
winning hearts and minds through stomachs”).
24 Food as Ambassador: Thailand’s Gastro-Diplomacy, Like the Cuisine, Like
the Country, ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/999687
[http://perma.cc/KL29-748T].
25 Id.
26 See Juyan Zhang, The Foods of the Worlds: Mapping and Comparing
Contemporary Gastrodiplomacy Campaigns, 9 INT’L J. COMM. 568 (2015),
http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/2847/1316 [http://perma.cc/S2HQ-AXTG].
27 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Department of State to Launch
Diplomatic Culinary Partnership (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2012/09/197375.htm [http://perma.cc/WWR6-AUP5] (noting that this program will
“elevate the role of culinary engagement in America’s formal and public diplomacy
efforts”). It is worthwhile to note that Americans have been unofficially engaged in
gastro-diplomacy for decades through the global proliferation of fast food chains and
American staple products, such as Coca-Cola. Mark Weiner, Consumer Culture and
Participatory Democracy: The Story of Coca-Cola During WWII, in FOOD IN THE USA: A
READER, supra note 15, at 123, 123-24 (noting that “Coca Cola . . . has come to
symbolize the American nation . . . . [T]he national characteristic it represents is a
political one, a democratic vision of consumer abundance . . . .”).
28 See MINTZ, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing the particular importance of sharing
meals as at “the same time a form of self-identification and of communication”).
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content, preparation, and the format of the meal, that impart a
sense of uniformity and commonality on a diverse population.29
Participation in the ritual is a nationalistic affirmation, a
commitment to joining the United States’ (revisionist) history.
“Recalling the first harvest of the Pilgrim Fathers, it has never
become just another holiday . . . . [It] has been embraced by
each immigrant wave as a sign of arrival, an assertion of
American oneness.”30
When a political, religious, or ethnic minority is unable
to conform to a national food practice, that minority is also
excluded from a sense of national identity.31 Historically, fear
of the impact that immigrant populations would have on
American life has led to efforts to reprogram immigrants’ diets
through classes, school lunches, and cookbooks.32 In discussing
Jewish middle-class homes in the United States, Timothy
Lytton noted that many Jews stopped keeping kosher because
it “set them apart from other Americans.”33 Ultimately, this led
to a proliferation of products marketed to kosher families to
make them feel “American”: recipes for kosher meatloaf,
oatmeal cookies, and even imitation bacon.34
B.

Taint: Real Harm, Real Cases

Whether or not offensive taint to food is a real harm is not
abstract. Plaintiffs have sought redress for exposure to such
tainted foods, although these claims have not been conventionally
successful.35 Many of these claims are tied to religious beliefs,
though they need not be to qualify as offensive taint. Claims could

29 See generally Janet Siskind, The Invention of Thanksgiving: A Ritual of
American Nationality, in FOOD IN THE USA: A READER, supra note 15 at 42 (describing
how participation in Thanksgiving “transforms a collection of immigrants into
Americans”).
30 Simon Jenkins, The Politics of Giving Thanks, LONDON TIMES 16 (Nov. 27,
1993) (reporting on the political meaning of Thanksgiving).
31 See Melissa Mortazavi, Consuming Identities: Law, School Lunches, and What
It Means to Be American, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4, 22-28 (2014) (discussing how
the school meal program marginalizes children from minority food backgrounds).
32 See, e.g., Carole Bardenstein, Transmissions Interrupted: Reconfiguring
Food, Memory, and Gender in the Cookbook—Memoirs of Middle Eastern Exiles, 28
SIGNS 353, 357 n.6 (2002).
33 LYTTON, supra note 9, at 43.
34 Id. at 44-45.
35 Tort lawsuits, however, play an important role in bringing forward
additional viewpoints and arguments in the American legal system, and they support
democratic structures by increasing venues for deliberative input. Melissa Mortazavi,
Tort as Democracy: Lessons from the Food Wars, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 929, 931 (2015).
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be made in any case where a party is exposed to food that the
party finds morally or politically objectionable.
The religiously animated cases involve exposure to food
that violates the religious food restrictions of the parties suing.
Strict Hindu plaintiffs, who as a matter of faith are vegetarian,
have sought redress for exposure to foods that contain meat—
each time unsuccessfully.36 But Hindus are not alone in
seeking redress for exposure to offensively tainted food. Jews
have sued for being sold and served nonkosher food when the
food was represented as kosher.37 In these cases, claims have
been successful where the failure to provide religiously
compliant food was a breach of contract, but courts in these
cases have not recognized a dignitary harm.
Muslim plaintiffs have also sued grocery stores,
restaurants, and vitamin companies for exposure to nonhalal
products, but they have rarely received relief.38 In Lateef v.
Pharmavite LLC, the plaintiff who sought redress for exposure
to pork content in vitamins labeled as vegetarian had her
claims denied as preempted by federal law.39 Recently, in a
2012 suit against fast-food behemoth Wendy’s, a pro se Muslim
plaintiff claiming “unspecified damages for pain and suffering”
had his complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim.40 Such
claims are not new; more than a decade earlier, a Muslim
plaintiff sued McDonald’s for unwanted exposure to animal
36 See, e.g., Gupta v. Asha Enters., L.L.C., 27 A.3d 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2011); Valluru v. Taco Bell, Case Nos. SC99-417, SC99-418 (Small Cl. Ct.,
Lancaster Cty., Neb., filed 1999).
37 Rockowitz, Roz & Edward v. Huntington Town House, Inc., Case No.
0026954/1994 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., N.Y. 1996) (plaintiffs won a jury verdict for
defendant’s failure to provide kosher food when contracted to do so; no emotional
distress was recognized, as this verdict was based purely on breach of contract claim);
Erlich v. Mun. Court of Beverly Hills Judicial Dist., 360 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1961) (finding
that claims alleging sale of nonkosher chicken as kosher were not sufficient due to
failure to adequately allege intent).
38 Lateef v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 12 C 5611, 2013 WL 1499029 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
10, 2013) (Muslim plaintiff sued Nature Made Vitamins for failing to disclose the use of
animal products in vitamin casing); Lopez v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., No. 5:12 CV 1412,
2012 WL 5271747 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (alleging misrepresentation when an
employee failed to list bacon on a sandwich bought and consumed by a Muslim); Cofield
v. McDonald’s Corp., 514 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1987) (dismissing for failure to state a claim
a suit by a Muslim plaintiff against McDonald’s for using animal fat in frying);
Galaspi-Bey v. Safeway, Inc., No. 727493, 1996 WL 746906, 1996 WL 746335, 1996 WL
746575, 1996 WL 746404 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty. 1994) (three Muslim plaintiffs
sued Safeway for exposure to beef tainted with pork, chicken, and horsemeat; Safeway
settled the suit); Verdict and Settlement Summaries, Galaspi-Bey v. Safeway, Inc., No.
727493, 1996 WL 746906, 1996 WL 746335, 1996 WL 746575, 1996 WL 746404 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Alameda Cty. 1994).
39 Lateef, 2013 WL 1499029, at *1.
40 Lopez, 2012 WL 5271747, at *1.
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fat.41 That case was dismissed for a procedural error: failure to
properly identify a defendant in a timely fashion.42 Thus far,
the most successful suit involving Muslim plaintiffs suing for
offensive taint, Benjamin Galaspi-Bey, Jr. v. Safeway, Inc.,
ended with a modest settlement of $1,500–$2,500 for each of
four plaintiffs.43 In Galaspi-Bey, the meat at issue allegedly
contained both pork and horsemeat.44
Some claimants have also sought redress on behalf of
many religious groups rather than just one. For example, a
kosher Jewish plaintiff sued on behalf of not only Jews but also
Hari Krishnas, Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, Taoists, Sikhs, and
Muslims when she discovered that Panda Express used chicken
stock in the preparation of vegetable menu items.45 It is
unclear how this case was resolved; a motion to certify a class
was dismissed nearly two years later without a court opinion.46
One of the most famous examples of a suit regarding
unexpected exposure to meat products was when McDonald’s
was sued for using beef tallow in its french fries.47 In that suit,
plaintiffs articulated their spiritual commitment to not eating
beef and being vegetarian and alleged that the french fries at
McDonald’s were made using beef fat.48 The case ultimately
settled for roughly $12 million, but the terms of the settlement are
more notable than its amount.49 Here, the major settlement terms
required the corporation to make a donation of $10 million to
vegetarian and religious groups and to issue a public apology.50
Cofield, 514 So. 2d, at 953-54.
Id.
43 Verdict and Settlement Summaries, Galaspi-Bey, 1996 WL 746906, 1996
WL 746335, 1996 WL 746575, 1996 WL 746404.
44 Id. It is worth noting that the broader market ramifications of horsemeat
allegations as generally offensive may have been partially responsible for the
willingness of the company to settle.
45 See Complaint, Adelpour v. Panda Express, Inc., No. BC425869, 2009 WL
4055755 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. Nov. 12, 2009).
46 Adelpour v. Panda Express, Inc., No. BC425869, 2011 WL 9689206 (Cal.
Super. Ct., L.A. Cty. June 20, 2011) (noting rejection of class without prejudice).
47
McDonald’s to Settle Suits on Beef Tallow in French Fries, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/09/us/mcdonald-s-to-settle-suits-onbeef-tallow-in-french-fries.html [http://perma.cc/S5BX-Q8CV] [hereinafter McDonald’s to
Settle] (reporting lawsuits in Washington, Illinois, California, New Jersey, and Texas).
48
Id.; Vegetarians’ Suit Hits McDonald’s French Fries, CHI. TRIB., May 4,
2001, at 3 (reporting on a class action filed in Kings County, Seattle, by a Hindu,
vegetarian plaintiff).
49 Beefing Up Its Fries Will Cost Fast-Food Giant $12.4M: A Victory for
Veggies, EDMONTON J. (Can.), Mar. 10, 2002, at A3.
50
McDonald’s to Settle, supra note 47 (reporting that the settlement would
consist of $10 million to be donated to vegetarian, Sikh, and Hindu organizations, in
addition to a public apology, small payments to class representatives, and lawyers’ fees).
41

42
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Plaintiffs have also expressly asserted the impact of
such exposures on their identities in articulating their claims.
In Rai v. Taco Bell, a devout Hindu who ordered a bean burrito
was served a beef one.51 Having eaten one bite of it, Mr. Rai
claimed that his “most fundamental religious principle” was
violated.52 He stated that he needed to purify himself and that
eating cow was “a really devastating experience . . . [,] [s]o
much so that I had to go to a psychiatrist. I went to a doctor. I
couldn’t sleep.”53 In a similar case, devout Hindus were served
meat samosas rather than vegetarian ones and also sought
damages to pay for religious purification.54
In Vallaru v. Taco Bell, the plaintiffs, an Indian couple,
appeared pro se in small claims court, where they sought
redress for eating meat in rice that, according to the
establishment’s nutritional guide, should have contained no
meat.55 In making their claim, the Vallaru family also sought
the cost of returning to India—$2,100 per person—to engage in
a religious purification ceremony in the Ganges River.56 When
the court denied their claims for relief, it noted that “[while]
the court does not question the sincerity of the Plaintiff’s
beliefs or motives in this case, the plaintiffs have failed to
provide sufficient evidence to justify a judgment in their
favor.”57 Reporting on the case, news sources stated that the judge
dismissed the claims “because [the pleadings] did not show the
rice was tainted or unfit for human consumption.”58 Mr. Vallaru
stated that he would pay for the trip to India despite losing the
case, because “[i]t’s a must for me that I do it.”59
The violation to personhood here is real. Another Hindu
served meat products after diligently questioning the restaurant
regarding the content of the food articulated his frustration and
sense of marginalization in his pro se complaint as follows:
51 Hilary MacGregor, Hindu Sues for Wrongly Being Served a Beef Burrito,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jan/24/local/me-11551
[http://perma.cc/G4PB-FRM8] (reporting on Rai v. Taco Bell, No. CIV178430 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Ventura Cty. Jan. 20, 1998)).
52 Id.
53 Id. Mr. Rai’s lawyer noted, “What about the mental impact here? . . . This
is the equivalent of eating his ancestors.” Id.
54 Gupta v. Asha Enters., L.L.C., 27 A.3d 953, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
55 Valluru v. Taco Bell, No. SC99-417, SC99-418 (Small Cl. Ct., Lancaster
Cty., Neb., filed 1999).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Vegetarians
Lose Against Taco Bell, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 28, 1999),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-08-28/news/9908280047_1_purification-ceremonytaco-bell-ganges-river [http://perma.cc/WM3U-CJ2V].
59 Id.
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Imagine a restaurant you’ve trusted for five years tells you that
they’ve been serving you cat meat in your food? How would you feel?
Soiled? Violated? Deceived? Betrayed? That’s how I feel. Are we
veggies so marginal that we can be lied to over a period of years with
immunity . . . ? [A]re we so little regarded that our sensibilities can
be so routinely trivialized and trampled?60

Arguably, some of these cases are a result of
carelessness, rather than deliberate action. Some, however,
arose from situations where the food provider chose to include
but not disclose the presence of an ingredient in its product
that caused it to be offensively tainted. In Lateef v. Pharmavite
LLC, Nature Made Vitamins had encapsulated its vitamins in
pork gelatin without disclosing any animal byproducts on the
label.61 In fact, the label on the vitamins in question stated that
“Vitamin B–12 supplements are recommended . . . for vegetarians
and vegans who avoid dietary sources rich in Vitamin B–12.”62
A Muslim woman, having diligently read the label and visited
the company website to ascertain whether the vitamins
contained any pork, brought suit alleging a breach of express
warranty, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment when she
learned the vitamins contained gelatin.63 The vitamin company
did not argue that the insertion of the pork gelatin was
accidental—only that the disclosure of the gelatin was not
required by law.64 The court deemed the company’s statements
regarding the product’s suitability for vegetarians—its
“commitment to . . . transparency,” “support[ ] [for] healthy
lifestyles,” “belief in ‘empowering consumers,’” and
communication regarding “important details of [its]
products”—to be puffery and not actionable.65
Plaintiffs have also sought redress for offensive taint
when the offense was not related to religious beliefs. Without
making any religious claims, a 2007 class sued Vienna Beef for
advertising its meat product as “all beef” when the casings
were pork.66 Despite pork clearly being prohibited in the
Jewish and Muslim faiths, plaintiffs decided to articulate their
60
Complaint at ¶¶ (d), (e), Steve Karian v. Fajitas & Ritas Rest. (Mass.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2014) (No. 140857G).
61
Lateef v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 12 C 5611, 2013 WL 1499029, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 10, 2013).
62 Id. at *2.
63 Id.
64 Lateef v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 12 C 5611, 2012 WL 5269619, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2012) (earlier version of the case dismissed as being preempted by federal regulation).
65 Lateef, 2013 WL 1499029, at *3.
66 Gershengorin v. Vienna Beef, Ltd., No. 06 C 6820, 2007 WL 2840476 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 2007), dismissed without prejudice, 2008 WL 751636 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2008).
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claim without reference to religion.67 Recently, the “kosher”
content of Hebrew National Franks has been challenged as not
being “100% kosher,” on the broad basis that all consumers,
religiously motivated or not, view “kosher” foods as more pure.68
In Popovitch v. Denny’s Restaurant, a self-described but
not religiously motivated vegetarian woman was served meat
after specifically seeking a meat-free meal.69 Afterwards, the
woman became physically ill and emotionally distraught. The
trial court dismissed her claims of negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, stating that the restaurant had
no duty to protect her emotional well-being, and moreover, that
she had failed to articulate a harm.70
One could argue that offensive taint need not be viewed
as an issue confined to minority interests or even a religious,
moral, or political conviction. Offensive taint could apply to the
presence of nonphysically harmful substances that are
repulsive due to social norms. A contemporary example of such
“yuck” factor offensive taint was illustrated by the public
outcry in 2012 regarding the use of lean finely textured beef
(LFTB), colloquially known as “pink slime,” in domestic beef
products.71 LFTB is a viscous substance made by highly
processing beef trimmings using a centrifuge, treating the
substance with ammonium gas, and then reintroducing this
product into conventional ground beef.72 There are no known
health or safety issues associated with LFTB.73 Nonetheless,
consumers reacted negatively to having this form of beef added
to standard ground beef. Because “pink slime” is made
Id.; see LYTTON, supra note 9, at 40.
Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2014).
69 Popovitch v. Denny’s Rest., No. B177296, 2005 WL 1926550 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 12, 2005).
70 Id. at *2.
71 JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42473, LEAN FINELY TEXTURED BEEF:
THE “PINK SLIME” CONTROVERSY 1 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42473.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8CL2-7BS4] (noting that “[t]he depiction of LFTB in the media as ‘pink
slime’ raised the product’s ‘yuck’ factor and implied that there were food safety issues
with LFTB”).
72 Questions and Answers About Lean Finely Textured Beef, NORTH AM. MEAT
INST., https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/76184%20
[http://perma.cc/T3QF-HKKC] (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
73 Elisabeth Hagen, Setting the Record Straight on Beef, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2012/03/22/setting-the-recordstraight-on-beef/ [http://perma.cc/9JPG-JUE3] (USDA Under Secretary for Food Safety
stated that “[t[he process used to produce LFTB is safe and has been used for a very
long time” and furthermore that “adding LFTB to ground beef does not make that
ground beef any less safe to consume”); Plaintiff ’ s Opposition to the ABC Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, Beef Prods., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No. 4:12-cv-04183, 2012 WL 6888678
(D.S.D. Nov. 28, 2012).
67
68
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exclusively of beef, representing LFTB as 100% beef is factually
accurate.74 Thus, members of the public offended by the inclusion
of LFTB in ground beef do not have clear legal redress regarding
mislabeling, fraud, or consumer protection.75
These cases may seem limited; however, the fact that
there are not more does not necessarily indicate that such
infringements on personal autonomy are rare. Rather, this is
likely a product of such claims’ uncertain status and client
screening by lawyers. Lawyers who take on these civil cases are
likely to do them on a contingency-fee basis. In selecting cases,
attorneys assess how likely the cases are to settle or to win.76
Given that there is no clear statutory or regulatory hook for these
types of claims, the lawyers are left to craft common law
arguments—ones that may be less established. A risk-averse
lawyer might not take on a food case related to offensive taint,
particularly against a smaller-revenue defendant.77 In the cases
highlighted above, generally, counsel represented plaintiffs who
confronted a large business entity such as ConAgra.78 In cases
with deep-pocket defendants, the potential of settlement, with or
without a winning legal argument, may be enough to lure lawyers
into representation.79
74 In this case, however, the form that the beef took was so offensive to the public
that the USDA allowed schools to opt out of using it in school lunches, legislators called for it to
be banned, and major companies volunteered to discontinue its use.
75 The law does recognize and regulate food that is actually adulterated in
some way that renders it “unfit” to eat. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 342(a)(3) (2012) (providing that a food is deemed adulterated “if it consists in
whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substances, or if it is otherwise
unfit for food”).
76 Michael A. Dover, Contingent Percentage Fees: An Economic Analysis, 51 J.
AIR L. & COM. 531, 539-41 (1986) (“An attorney will accept a case only if he determines
that the expected recovery is greater than the anticipated expenses of the litigation.”
(footnote omitted)); Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 813, 815 (1989) (“The contingent fee, of course, shifts a large portion of the risk
in a case to the attorney. Clients receive the added satisfaction of knowing that the lawyer
would not have accepted the representation unless it was the attorney’s professional judgment
that the case presented a reasonable likelihood of a favorable outcome.”).
77 Herbert M. Kritzer, Defending Torts: What Should We Know?, 1 J. TORT L.
3, 19 (2007) (“A central question for any plaintiffs’ lawyer considering accepting a new
client is collectability of any settlement or judgment.”); William A. Lovett, Exxon
Valdez, Punitive Damages, and Tort Reform, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1071,
1097-98 (2003) (“Deep pockets are sought increasingly by plaintiffs[’] attorneys as the
best way to maximize larger verdicts, settlements, or punitive awards. To the extent
that a wealthy defendant is a ‘substantial’ and ‘legal cause in fact’ of a tortious injury
or accident, plaintiffs[’] lawyers focus on these targets for suit.” (footnote omitted)).
78 See, e.g., Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014)
(indicating that the Wallace class was represented by a team of at least five lawyers).
79 The phenomenon of corporate settlement mills, where private corporations
have policies regarding settlement as a matter of course to avoid costly litigation,
prevent inquiries into actual fault. Rather than assessing settlement on the basis of the
value of a legal claim, if the claim falls within a certain class of claims, the company
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CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM: SEARCHING FOR REDRESS

This article now turns to the issue of how the law treats
claims of offensive food taint, rather than more conventional
claims of food safety risk.
Whether courts will recognize the injury sustained to
one’s person in these cases of offensive food taint remains
unclear. Traditionally, harm is either physical or economic, and
some courts have specifically rejected spiritual damages as a
cognizable injury.80 Other courts have recognized more of food’s
unique nature. This part analyzes how courts have approached
offensive food taint in the realms of constitutional law, state
statutory law, regulatory law, and common law tort.
A.

Constitutional Law

When seeking redress for infringements on expression,
identity, or faith, constitutional law seems like a natural
basecamp. Isn’t the free exercise of faith protected by the First
Amendment?81 Couldn’t the choice of what we eat be viewed as
expressive conduct and therefore symbolic speech?82 While a
deeper development of constitutional theory as it applies to food is
likely worth additional inquiry, existing constitutional law is
unlikely to provide redress at this time.83 Cases of offensive taint,
like those this article has described, are not about infringement
on expressive rights by the state so much as they are about the
law recognizing certain rights between private parties.84 Because
will simply settle as a matter of course. See Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman,
The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. REV. 129, 141-42 (2015).
80 Gupta v. Asha Enters., L.L.C., 27 A.3d 953, 960 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
2011) (stating that plaintiffs failed to allege a cognizable harm when what “they are
seeking is the cost of cure for an alleged spiritual injury that cannot be categorized as
either a loss of moneys or property”).
81 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
82 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (discussing cross burning and
how “[t]he First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as
well as to actual speech”).
83 There has been limited discussion of the issue of the constitutionality of
government restrictions on food choice and compelled eating. Samuel R. Wiseman,
Liberty of Palate, 65 MAINE L. REV. 738,744 (2013) (concluding that there is no due
process protection for right to food choice).
84 Based
on cases involving the refusal of medical treatment and
nourishment, there may be a constitutional right to refuse to eat certain food if
mandated by government. See id. at 748-49; Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled,
15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 266 (2012) (arguing that “force-feeding broccoli to an
otherwise sui juris person suspected of nothing but an aversion to eating broccoli would
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constitutional protections in the Bill of Rights apply as
restrictions on federal and state action,85 they are unlikely to be
useful here, where the issue is not so much state action, but the
actions of private food producers and marketers and their
interactions with the public.86 Moreover, existing constitutional
law recognizes that generally applicable neutral laws are valid
even if they incidentally burden religion.87
To the extent that government involvement is an issue,
it is passive inaction that could be viewed as contributing to the
issue of offensive taint. One argument might be that the failure to
require more precise labeling undermines consumers’ ability to
protect their own expressive identity. In the takings context,
scholars have argued that government failure to regulate action
that results in the destruction of property could be viewed as a
taking subject to constitutional protection.88 Here, it could be
argued that it is the failure of the government to regulate that
results in the offensive taint exposure. This argument is unlikely
to gain traction. Even in the takings context, where the loss of
property is a clear and ascertainable traditional harm,
equating government inaction to improper government action
has not yet been embraced generally in the case law.
To the extent that courts have applied constitutional
law in the food context, it has been to avoid imposing additional
labeling requirements that would implicate religious beliefs. In
this way, the First Amendment may actually impede courts’
ability to adjudicate instances of offensive taint. Courts have held
that extensive regulation oversteps the bounds of protected
commercial speech.89 In relation to food specifically, courts
also violate either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, depending on whether the
force-feeders were federal or state officials”).
85 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1968) (noting that “the Due
Process Clause imposes some restrictions on state action that parallel Bill of Rights
restrictions on federal action”).
86 That said, cases regarding search and seizure that recognize bodily
integrity are useful in seeing how the law recognizes intrusion on one’s physical person.
However, this article brackets off the fascinating topic of the Fourth Amendment’s
treatment of bodily intrusion and its potential intersection with civil conceptions of
bodily harm for a fuller discussion and more thorough treatment at a later time.
87 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990), superseded by statute as stated in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
88 Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to
Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
89 See generally Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996)
(sustaining dairy manufacturers’ challenge to the constitutionality of a 1994 Vermont
law requiring products from cows treated with bovine growth hormone to be labeled as
such as an infringement on protected commercial speech); Coleen Klasmeier & Martin
H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A
Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L., MED. & ETHICS 315,
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have recognized labeling as a form of protected commercial
speech.90 This can be problematic for regulators who seek to
add labeling requirements for public policy reasons.91
Some have also argued (with limited success) that the
Establishment Clause prohibits courts from adjudicating issues
that implicate religious food rules.92 The First Amendment dictates
that courts cannot make decisions on “intrinsically religious”
questions.93 Under the dominant Establishment Clause test
initially articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which bars “excessive
government entanglement with religion,”94 the inquiry is “whether
the government is being ‘charged with enforcing a set of religious
laws’ . . . or is making an inquiry into the religious content of the
items sold.”95 In Wallace v. ConAgra, consumers sued the
manufacturer of Hebrew National hot dogs, alleging that the meat
inside was not 100% kosher. The defendant’s lawyers successfully
argued at the district court level that the case rested predominately
on interpreting the religious laws defining kosher meat practices,
and therefore, enforcing kosher provisions would impermissibly
entangle government with religious interpretation.96 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit refused to reach the First Amendment
question.97 Instead, the case was remanded to the state court
on standing grounds for failure to state an injury in fact.98
317 (2011) (describing how commercial speech limits FDA regulatory action,
particularly regarding off-label uses).
90 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131 (2d Cir.
2009) (recognizing First Amendment commercial speech issues in a case involving
restaurant menu calorie information); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628,
635 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that terms like “antibiotic-free” and “pesticide-free”
constitute commercial speech).
91 Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that FDA
pre-approval of dietary supplement information violated the First Amendment
protections on commercial speech).
92 Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998-1000 (D. Minn.
2013), reversed, remanded, and vacated by Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d
1025 (8th Cir. 2014) (recognizing a First Amendment conflict in discerning whether
kosher standards had been breached in producing kosher-marketed meat products,
finding that “whether such products are indeed ‘100% kosher’ is a religious question
that is not the proper subject of inquiry by this Court”).
93 Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1969); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991).
94 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
95 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 800 F. Supp. 2d 405,
414 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. Rubin, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
96 Wallace, 920 F. Supp. at 997-98 (stating that “[a]djudication of Plaintiffs’
claims in this case would clearly require a review of doctrinal and religious matters”).
97 Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2014).
98 Id. at 1033.
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The Second Circuit, considering whether it could enforce
the New York “Kosher Act,” found that the law enforcing “kosher”
labeling did not excessively entangle government with religion.99
Instead, the court reasoned,
[t]he law only requires that if a product is to be held out to the public
as “kosher,” the product must bear a label describing it as such, and
information is to be provided to the purchaser as to the basis for that
description. The presence of the label does not affect the seller’s
assessment of the kosher nature of a product and is not what makes
a product kosher or not kosher. The label simply indicates to the
consumers that the seller or producer, and its certifier, believe the
food to be kosher under their own standards.100

Finally, one case has allowed assertions of a more
generalizable right of autonomy grounded in food choice to move
forward. In Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund v. Sebelius, a
case challenging regulations preventing the transport of raw milk
across state lines, plaintiffs asserted harm to their “fundamental
and inalienable rights . . . to produce, obtain, and consume the
foods of choice for themselves and their families.”101 The court
found that plaintiffs had standing and that their claim was ripe
on a theory that a “credible threat of an injury exists” so long as
possible enforcement actions by governmental entities might
arise.102 While this is far from recognizing food choice as a liberty
interest, it did allow a claim so articulated to withstand judicial
scrutiny. Still, as of yet, none of these cases have provided a clear
or successful cause of action.
B.

State Statutory Law

Many food-related cases today are brought pursuant to
statutory tort regimes that protect consumers from misleading
statements and false advertising.103 Misleading statements are a
99

Cir. 2012).

Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 208 (2d

Id. at 207.
Farm-to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 668, 678
(N.D. Iowa 2010).
102 Id. at 690 (quoting American Charities for Reasonable Fundraising
Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas Cty., 221 F.3d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 2000)).
103 See, e.g., Gustavson v. Mars, Inc., No. 13-cv-04537-LHK, 2014 WL 6986421,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014) (misrepresentation of calorie content); Gitson v. Trader
Joe’s Co., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (alleging misrepresentation in using
the term “evaporated cane juice” instead of sugar); Rojas v. General Mills, Inc., No. 12-cv05099-WHO, 2013 WL 5568389, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (alleging that General Mills
deceptively and misleadingly marketed their products as “100% natural” when the
products contained GMOs); In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Nat. Litig., No. 12-MD-2413
(RRM)(RLM), 2013 WL 4647512, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (alleging Frito-Lay
100
101
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statutory form of common law negligent misrepresentation and
arise where a false statement of material fact may be
actionable, absent intent, because a tortfeasor owed a duty of
care to the injured party and there is detrimental reliance (as
manifested in an economic or physical harm).104 False
advertising is a claim about fraud and differs from negligent
misrepresentation in that it requires intent to deceive.105 While
almost every state in the United States has some form of
statutory tort law regarding deceptive practices, states differ
on whether their consumer protection laws protect consumers
from misrepresentation, fraud, or both.106
But these statutory tort forms of redress usually
impliedly exclude freestanding dignitary harms that include
exposure to offensive foods. Such statutes, like many of their
common law predecessors, require a showing of reliance that
led to economic detriment.107 In Georgia, for instance, the
Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act has been
applied to deny any monetary relief and authorizes only
equitable relief.108
Some states’ laws are more open ended, arguably covering
offensive taint. In Vermont, to establish a claim under the
Consumer Protection Act, a plaintiff must prove three elements:
(1) [T]here must be a representation, practice, or omission likely to
mislead consumers; (2) the consumers must be interpreting the
message reasonably under the circumstances; and (3) the misleading

fraudulently marketed products as “all natural” when the products contained GMOs).
Some estimate that fraud-related food litigation has increased markedly in recent years.
See Ray Latif, Explosion of Consumer Fraud Lawsuits Has Industry on Its Heels,
BEVNET (June 17, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.bevnet.com/news/2013/explosion-ofconsumer-fraud-lawsuits-has-industry-on-its-heels [http://perma.cc/C6XF-KF4V].
104 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 469, 472, at 1343-44, 1349 (2008).
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., Kansas Consumer Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. 50-626(b)(1) (West
2015) (not requiring intent to deceive); Moore v. Bird Eng’g Co., 41 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2002)
(interpreting a Kansas statute as not requiring intent to deceive); Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405 (2006) (providing cause
of action for both unfair and deceptive trade practices).
107 See Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, ALA. CODE § 8-19-10 (2016)
(requiring monetary damages); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ.
8742(DLC), 2011 WL 196930, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011) (granting summary
judgment to beverage manufacturer because plaintiffs failed to prove they paid more
for Snapple’s products than they would have for comparable beverages); Weiner v.
Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 5, 2010) (denying class certification because plaintiff could not demonstrate that
issues of causation and economic injury could be established on a class-wide basis).
108 Somerson v. McMahon, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(interpreting Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-372); First Quality Carpets, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 54 A.3d
465, 472 (Vt. 2012) (quoting Greene v. Stevens Gas Serv., 858 A.2d 238 (Vt. 2004)).
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effects must be “material,” that is, likely to affect consumers’ conduct
or decision with regard to a product.109

Under a statute worded this way, the court would be left to
interpret how to assess material effects. Given the limited
circumstances in which these damages are generally recognized,
such an interpretation is unlikely absent legislative action.
C.

Federal Statutory and Regulatory Law

Food is a heavily regulated commodity in the American
market. At present, at least 15 federal agencies work to
regulate food production, consumption, and marketing.110 Of
these, three agencies play the principal roles in regulating food:
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). In the broadest strokes, the USDA
oversees the regulation of livestock products (meat, eggs, and
dairy), the organic foods program, and food security programs
such as school meals and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP).111 The FDA is charged with regulating “any
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render [food]
injurious to health.”112 The EPA takes the lead on regulating
herbicides, pesticides, and the quality of bottled water.113
Congress delegates power to federal agencies through
statutes. The scope of these agencies’ powers is limited and

109 See Poulin v. Ford Motor Co., 513 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Vt. 1986) (citing
International Harvester Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,217 (Dec. 21, 1984)); see
also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (2016).
110 See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL
FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM: A PRIMER 1 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22600.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FS2R-8NA3].
111 USDA Programs and Services, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/w
ps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=PROGRAMS_SERVICES [http://perma.cc/X7GN-87Q7]
(last updated Mar. 31, 2016) (noting USDA oversight of organic program as well as
federal assistance programs such as SNAP); Food Safety, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=food-safety [http://perma.cc/DF93VBYF] (last updated June 29, 2015) (discussing the USDA’s role in relation to livestock and
that the “USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) ensures that our nation’s meat,
poultry and processed egg supply is wholesome, safe and properly labeled”).
112
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2012).
113 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2012) (generally
granting the EPA the power to regulate and define toxic substances); see also Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2012) (vesting the
EPA with the power to license pesticides and herbicides as well as set levels of
acceptable toxicity in food); 40 C.F.R. § 152.1 (2015) (detailing registration of pesticides
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act); 21 U.S.C. § 349 (2012)
(authorizing the EPA’s power to regulate bottled water).
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determined by the statutes that create them.114 In the case of
the FDA, its principal enabling statutes115 are the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and its most recent and
comprehensive revision, the Food Safety Modernization Act
(FSMA).116 Labeling is generally governed by the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act (FPLA) and the 1990 revisions to the FDCA,
known as the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).117
The FPLA requires that the FDA issue labeling regulations
requiring the disclosure of the contents, identity, and name and
location of the manufacturer or distributor of all food commodities
on the domestic market.118 The NLEA and subsequent
regulations and guidance documents set forth mandatory
requirements for labeling on packaged food and in restaurants
and retail food establishments.119 Among many other
requirements, labels under the regulations promulgated
pursuant to NLEA must include certain nutritional and serving
information as well as sodium, carbohydrate, and fat content.120
Labeling regulations do not, however, require disclosure of all
ingredients in a marketed foodstuff.121 Rather, according to the
FDA, “If an ingredient is present at an incidental level and has no
functional or technical effect in the finished product, then it need
114 Cheng v. WinCo Foods LLC, No. 14-cv-0483-JST, 2014 WL 2735796, at *7
(N.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (noting that “administrative agencies derive their power from
their enabling statutes,” and “[a]n agency cannot expand the scope of its powers
independent of a legislative grant of authority” (citation omitted)).
115 An “enabling statute,” also known as an originating or organic statute, is a
statute that delegates power to administrative agencies and sets forth the scope of
their legislative mandate.
116 Federal Food, Drug and, Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2012); FDA
Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011); see FDA Food
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/default.htm [http://perma.cc/596X-3SFB] (last updated
July 8, 2016) (expanding the FDA’s ability to regulate the production process and refuse
tainted imports or shipments that did not pass inspection for the purposes of protecting
food safety).
117 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1467 (1966); Federal
Food, Drug and, Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 403(w) (2012); Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990, § 6(a), 21 U.S.C. § 343.
118 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453.
119 Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar
Retail Food Establishments, 79 Fed. Reg. 71,156 (2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
11, 101), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2014-12-01/2014-27833 [http://perma.cc/
Z753-8RZG]; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) Requirements (8/94-2/95),
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/iceci/inspections/inspection
guides/ucm074948.htm [http://perma.cc/ZE64-BJQP] (last updated Nov. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter NLEA Requirements].
120 NLEA Requirements, supra note 119.
121 Exemptions from Food Labeling Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 101.100(a)(3)
(2015) (listing foods that are exempt from declaration on a label due to their presence
as an “incidental additive”).
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not be declared on the label.”122 The principal exception to this
general rule is major allergens, which need to be disclosed
regardless of amount.123
In the flurry of food-related litigation in recent years, the
scope of the USDA’s and FDA’s power to consider non-safetyrelated issues has been questioned. As a doctrinal matter, there is
a strong argument that these agencies’ regulatory powers are
limited by their enabling statutes to considering food safety–
related issues and not to issues beyond those concerns.124 The
Supreme Court recently reiterated that the statute granting the
FDA the bulk of its delegated authority, the FDCA, “is designed
primarily to protect the health and safety of the public at
large.”125 These agencies themselves also interpret their mandate
narrowly. The FDA describes its directive relating to food as
regulating “the safety and security of most of our nation’s food
supply, all cosmetics, [and] dietary supplements.”126 The USDA
reiterated a commitment to food safety in public statements made
in response to public outcries regarding meat fillers, stating, “[I]t
is important to distinguish people’s concerns about how their food
is made from their concerns about food safety.”127
Defendants have also successfully argued that regulating
for purposes other than public health and safety is legally
impermissible. For example, in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v.
Shalala, a case challenging FDA regulations for not requiring the
labeling of genetically modified components of food products,
defendants successfully argued that the FDA’s power is limited by
statute.128 Specifically, defendants argued that the FDA does not
have the power to regulate based on consumer interests, but only
on health and safety risks.129
122 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, A FOOD LABELING GUIDE
18 (2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/UCM265446.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YP5V-US5W]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 101.100(a)(3).
123 Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(w) (2012) (requiring label for major food allergens).
124 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY
ACTION IN CONTEXT 4 (2015) (discussing how “agencies act pursuant to statutory
authority and . . . agencies exercise considerable discretion and power, although that
power is constrained by law”); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 123 (2000) (finding that regulating tobacco was outside the scope of the powers
delegated to the FDA).
125 See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014).
126 FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm192695.htm [http://perma.cc/QK7M-ZCTY] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
127 See Hagen, supra note 73.
128 All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (D.D.C. 2000).
129 Id. at 179.
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At the same time, FDA labeling regulations have been used
to successfully preempt offensive taint claims based on state law.
Preemption, in its most basic form, is a doctrine that provides that
where federal law has directly spoken on a legal issue, the federal
law trumps conflicting state law.130 In Lateef v. Pharmavite LLC,
discussed in more detail above,131 the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims without prejudice on the ground that federal law,
specifically the NLEA, preempted her claims.132 In that case, the
plaintiff had based her argument regarding misrepresentation on
the label of the Nature Made Vitamins that she was purchasing
and ingesting. In finding her claims preempted, the court noted
that the NLEA has an express preemption clause to “ensure
uniform labeling of food products” and that plaintiffs conceded that
additional disclosure requirements would be “inconsistent with
what the NLEA requires.”133
This preemption argument and the argument that
agency power is strictly limited to public health and safety
concerns are inapposite, however. If agencies promulgating
labeling laws are limited to regulating purely on the basis of
public health and safety, then they cannot be understood to have
created rules that directly speak to, and preempt, state law claims
of offensive food taint that would fall decisively outside the gamut
of their power. Therefore, under this interpretation of agency
power, preemption is not applicable. On the other hand, if
agencies do have the power to regulate based on other public
concerns, including offensive food taint, then agencies like the
FDA should be held accountable for failing to do so.
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court took a more
limited view of the scope of preemption in the food and drug
context and refused to preempt state law without express
congressional intent.134 In that case, plaintiff alleged that a
drug manufacturer failed to disclose negative side effects of a
drug available on the market. Defendants argued that federal
regulations preempted plaintiff’s state common law causes of
action in negligence and strict liability. 135
Generally, statutory and regulatory law has maintained
a singular focus on food safety. There is, however, one notable
130 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226-27 (2000) (outlining
three traditional forms preemption takes: express, field, and conflict).
131 See supra Section I.B.
132 Lateef v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 12 C 5611, 2012 WL 5269619 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2012).
133 Id. at *2-3.
134 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563, 574-75 (2009).
135 Id. at 560.
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example of when a federal statute took into account the
expressive qualities of food consumption in relation to prisoners
and the state. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) specifically provides that
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . ,
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.136

This statute provides a template for how food’s unique position can
be recognized, protected, and even augmented beyond typical legal
conceptions of food law and regulation. Under federal regulations
implementing this statute, prison officials at the state and federal
level are required to accommodate prisoners’ religious dietary
needs once the prisoner has made that need known through a
written statement.137 Pursuant to this law and subsequent
regulations, many prisoners have brought viable causes of action to
seek food accommodations not based on health, but on faith.138
D.

Common Law Torts

Torts—the law of accidents—would appear initially as
another natural fit for redressing exposure to offensive taint.
Leaving aside the intentional tort of battery for a fuller
discussion,139 other torts, such as common law negligence, are a
poor fit to address the harm in offensive taint claims. Although
such exposures arise from physical contact with a substance, their
impacts are not physical in the traditional sense of requiring
medical attention, causing deformity, or creating physical
disability. Generally, negligence requires a showing of harm
that, except in limited situations, must be physical or, at
136 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc).
137 Dietary Practices, 28 C.F.R. § 548.20 (2015) (stating that “[t]he Bureau
provides inmates requesting a religious diet reasonable and equitable opportunity to
observe their religious dietary practice within the constraints of budget limitations and
the security and orderly running of the institution and the Bureau through a religious
diet menu” and that “[t]he inmate will provide a written statement articulating the
religious motivation for participation in the religious diet program”).
138 See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing a valid
RLUIPA claim even after an inmate violated a religious fasting program); Shakur v.
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008) (Muslim inmate sought accommodation for halal
food needs under RLUIPA).
139 See infra Section III.B.
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minimum, economic.140 While the modern recognition of
freestanding emotional harms has grown, negligent infliction of
emotional distress in most situations still requires a physical
manifestation of distress.141
A claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) is equally unlikely to suffice. Even if a consumer can
establish that his or her exposure to the unwanted food was the
consequence of an intentional act (e.g., intentionally adding
animal-derived products to an otherwise vegetarian product
without disclosing it on the label), it is unlikely that this conduct
would be viewed as “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.”142 As such, situations where the law has recognized
IIED are limited to extreme situations of direct, inhumane
interaction such as torture,143 racial threats, and harassment.144
III.

RECOGNIZING PERSONHOOD AND FOOD: A PATH TO
REMEDIES

A.

Statutory and Administrative Remedies: Potential
Without Political Will

There are two clear avenues for reform in this area. The
first is to modify existing federal labeling laws to recognize sources
of offensive taint or require all ingredients and additives to be
included on labels, thereby providing a cause of action should there
be noncompliance. The second is to amend state statutory torts to
recognize a broader understanding of dignitary harm deriving from
an infringement on a party’s physical person. Neither of these is
likely to gain the political traction needed to move forward.
Modern labeling laws do not require disclosure of all
ingredients purposely included in a product.145 If it appears in only
“incidental levels” and lacks a “functional or technical effect,” the
140 JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS
47-50 (3d ed. 2012).
141 Id. at 699-700.
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
143 Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1981) (finding intentional
infliction of emotional distress where plaintiff was chained to a vehicle, repeatedly hit
with a blunt instrument, and threatened with mayhem and murder).
144 Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding IIED where
a woman in an interracial relationship was repeatedly threatened by her landlord by
phone and with notes left on the door to her home).
145 See supra notes 121-23.
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FDA does not require disclosure.146 Congress has, in recent years,
passed some statutes that demand more stringent labeling. The
major exception to this general rule of nondisclosure of trace
ingredients is the requirement of labeling major food allergens.
In 2004, in response to public concern over allergy-related injuries
and death, Congress enacted the Food Allergen Labeling and
Consumer Protection Act, requiring that eight particular
allergens must be listed on product labels regardless of the
allergen’s amount or functionality.147
There are four reasons why offensive food taint is
unlikely to elicit the same public outcry to build the political
will for national reform. First, each instance of offense impacts
a limited swath of the population. Unlike allergies, offensive
food taint does not cut across ethnic, cultural, or class divides.
Second, one could argue that allergies are immutable,
biological limitations, whereas offensive taint is driven by
choice. Third, the harm of offensive taint does not have the
same obvious gravity as death. As such, strong ex ante
regulation is easier to justify as a matter of policy for lifethreatening allergens, as opposed to offensive taint. Fourth,
any reform to food labeling in general means facing a broad
array of industry opposition, much of which would be costly to
counter or defeat in terms of political support. Modifying state
consumer protection law would face similar political hurdles as
national-level statutory reforms.
B.

Food as Tort: Battery’s Potential in Relation to Dignitary
Harms

While statutory reform on the federal and state level
would most immediately impact the lack of legal consequences of
offensive taint, the likelihood of such changes is contingent on
mass political action. For the reasons discussed above, such action
is unlikely to materialize for some time. On a claim-by-claim
basis, however, the flexibility and full scope of common law torts
has been strangely underexplored as an option for offensive taint
claims. For one sizeable subclass of cases—those involving

Exemptions from Food Labeling Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 101.100(a)(3) (2015).
Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(w) (2012) (requiring major food allergens be listed on labels); Food Allergen
Labeling and Consumer Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(qq) (2012) (identifying the
eight major food allergens covered by the act).
146

147
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intentional action—common law battery could provide a needed
and more immediate avenue of redress.148
Tort law is, at its very heart, about defining harms
between people.149 Applying traditional dignitary torts,
specifically battery, in the context of food-related harms may
protect claims between private parties regarding offensive food
taint.150 Battery is one of the oldest common law torts, and it
recognizes that “the slightest touching of another . . . if done in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the
law affords redress.”151 A prima facie case for battery requires an
act intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another
person or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a
contact, and that such an offensive or harmful contact directly or
indirectly results.152
In recent cases analyzing force, the Supreme Court
confirmed that battery was “satisfied by even the slightest
offensive touching.”153 Purely offensive touchings that do not
148 Others have noted how traditional dignitary harms provide workable
solutions to modern harms. See Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205 (2012) (arguing that common law intrusion, with its
emphasis on observation rather than dissemination, is the most effective way to
provide redress for modern privacy concerns).
149 “To study torts is to learn what sort of conduct our legal system defines as
wrongfully injurious toward another such that, when committed, the victim is entitled
to exact something from the wrongdoer. This is the domain of law that was born
centuries ago. . . .” John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88
TEX. L. REV. 917, 919 (2010).
150 “The behavior underlying these torts does more than inflict property
damage or even physical injury that the modern man is expected to rationally
commodify. Instead, it invades an individual’s sense of worth and dignity, important
values in a relational society.” Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from
the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 69 (2012).
151 Crosswhite v. Barnes, 124 S.E. 242, 244 (Va. 1924); 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 120, 218 (1768); Respublica v. De
Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 114 (1784) (“[T]hough no great bodily pain is
[s]uffered by a blow on the palm of the hand, or the [s]kirt of the coat, yet the[s]e are
clearly within the legal d[e]finition of A[ss]ault and . . . .”); 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE
LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 191 (1859) (noting that the writ of trespass covered
many of what we would now view as offensive bodily contacts, such as “spitting upon a
person; pushing another against him; throwing a squib or any missile or water upon
him” (footnotes omitted)); Wood v. Commonwealth, 140 S.E. 114, 115 (Va. 1927).
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Older cases
often describe the necessary touching as needing to be unlawful. See Vosburg v.
Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891) (describing the necessary element of intent as the
intent to commit an “unlawful” act). But “unlawful act” language popular in the
nineteenth century gave way in 1934, when the First Restatement rejected this
formulation in favor of the current “harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension
thereof” under Chapter 2, entitled “Intentional Invasions of Interests in Personality.”
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
153 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010); see also United States
v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1410-14 (2014) (applying a common law definition of
force as an offensive touching to interpret a domestic abuse statute).
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result in physical, economic, or emotional harm have a long
history of receiving redress in part to support tort as a
peacekeeping measure.154 In doing so, battery grounded in
offensive touching protects an individual’s dignitary right to his
or her own physical autonomy.155 Indeed, “[i]t is not necessary
that the touching result in injury to the person. Whether a
touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on
the force applied.”156
The Supreme Court is not alone in recently reaffirming
battery’s historic connection to offensive, but not physically
harmful, touchings. The American Law Institute’s Draft
Restatement (Third) of Torts, revised in 2015, specifically
recognizes offensive but not physically harmful touches as battery
in the context of intentional torts.157 Moreover, the current Draft
Restatement (Third) specifically includes a fact pattern involving
offensive food taint as an example of offensive battery.158 The
Restatement outlines a situation where a religious person informs
a wedding caterer that they cannot eat pork since it is a great
sin.159 The caterer nonetheless serves the person pork rather than
prepare an alternative.160 The Restatement concludes that the
“[c]aterer is subject to liability . . . for offensive battery.” 161
Many food cases involving consumers ingesting offensive
foodstuffs could fit within this broad rubric. Food producers who
intentionally, not accidentally, include in their products
ingredients that are objectively offensive to consumers whom they
know or should know will ingest their products should be subject
to liability under a battery theory.162 Intent to harm is not
154 Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872) (awarding punitive damages where
defendant deliberately spat on plaintiff while in court because such actions provoke
physical retribution, and an alternative method of redress must be provided by the law
to discourage future misconduct of this nature).
155 In 1914, Judge Cardozo wrote, “Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”
Scholendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (in discussing what
type of touching is actionable under what is now the modern tort of battery).
156 Adams v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (Va. Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming trial court’s decision to find that battery occurred in a case where a laser
beam was deliberately pointed at the plaintiff ’ s eye and no physical harm occurred).
157 DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 103, at 96 (AM. LAW INST. 2015)
(defining offensive contact for the purposes of battery).
158 Id. § 103, at 96.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 The doctrine of “extended personality” is well established in recognizing
that objects may be the source or the point of contact of a tortious intentional touching.
See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (finding battery
where an employee snatched a plate violently away from an African-American
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necessary, only the intent to create contact.163 Thus, hot dogs
marketed as “kosher” that purposely include nonkosher
components are not only misleading, but are also intentionally
touching a person in an objectively offensive way.164
The structure of the common law and the defense of
consent also favor using this framework as a solution in foodbased offensive taint cases. This structure for such legal claims
focuses on a party’s ability to control what is in his or her body
and an unwanted imposition on that autonomy. If these cases are
conceived of as battery claims, producers will better label
products—not for fear of mislabeling claims, but because consent
to the touching negates its wrongfulness. In order to bring
plausible defenses that consumers “consented,” manufacturers
will be motivated to clearly and fully label products, thereby
promoting the argument that consumers were aware of the
offensive element and chose to encounter it nonetheless. Without
clear labeling, food producers will most likely lose this defense to
the counterargument that any “consent” to the touching by eating
the product was obtained by fraudulent inducement.165 Plaintiffs,
in turn, will be able to make the moral choices that they are
entitled to make.
The biggest hurdle for these claims may be that the
offensive nature of a touching is assessed objectively.166 Generally,
in order for a contact [to] be offensive to a reasonable sense of
personal dignity, it must be one which would offend the ordinary
person and as such one not unduly sensitive as to his personal
dignity. It must, therefore, be a contact which is unwarranted by the

customer); Picard v. Barry Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 654 A.2d. 690, 694 (R.I. 1995) (“[C]ontact[ ]
with anything so connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the other’s
person and therefore as partaking of its inviolability [can establish battery].” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
163 For example, in Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
1978), the pregnant plaintiffs were administered the drug DES without being told
either that they were being given the drug or that they were part of a medical
experiment. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois said that “the
plaintiffs need show only an intent to bring about the contact,” but the focus of the
opinion was the rejection of any requirement that the plaintiffs prove intent to harm.
Id. at 718 (“[A]n intent to do harm is not essential to the action.”).
164 This was the subject of dispute in a recent case involving Hebrew National
hot dogs. Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014).
165 See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion
and Controversy, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1585, 1634 (2012).
166 Contact is offensive when it “offends a reasonable sense of personal
dignity.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The inquiry is
whether the touching “would be offensive to an ordinary person not unduly sensitive as
to personal dignity.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 42 (5th ed. 1984).
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social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is
inflicted.167

Not unlike most torts concepts, the success of meeting this
standard will depend on the factual framework’s scope. If asked, “Is
it objectively offensive to have meat in your food?” most jurors
would likely answer no (although they may find this repugnant in
a food item where meat is unexpected, like candy). But if phrased,
“Is it objectively offensive to be unwillingly exposed to food that
interferes with your religious or political beliefs?” the question
seems more likely to be answered affirmatively. While the offense
needed to trigger battery must be “highly offensive and not merely
offensive to the other’s sense of dignity,”168 that standard is
“significantly less demanding than the requirement of ‘extreme and
outrageous conduct’ [required] for the purposes of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional harm.”169 Concerns over fraud
may also be reassured by the fact that in addition to offense, an
actual physical touching must occur to be actionable.170
Leaving aside arguments about scope, the common law
also recognizes that notice can create additional forms of
offensive battery. Once a party knows subjectively of a person’s
wish not to be touched a certain way, touching them in that
particular way is battery.171 Because “an individual’s right of
autonomy with respect to physical contact with his or her body
historically has been very strongly protected,” it is objectively
offensive to touch a person in a way that they have already
articulated is offensive to them individually.172 Therefore, if the
tortfeasor has knowledge of an individual’s subjective and
167 Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1361 (Del. 1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
168 DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 103, at 98 (AM. LAW INST. 2015)
(noting how this elevated threshold is designed to restrict liability and combat
potential fraudulent or meritless claims).
169 Id. at 94.
170 Any party alleging battery based on offensive taint still needs to prove that
a touching actually occurred. See Siegel v. Ridgewells, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194
(D.D.C. 2007) (finding no battery occurred where plaintiff failed to prove actual contact
with nonkosher food that was served to wedding guests).
171 See, e.g., Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding, in a
case where a hospital was on notice that a patient’s religion prohibited her from having
her skin touched directly by men, that the touching of the patient’s skin by a male
nurse during surgery may constitute a battery); Perkins v. Lavin, 648 N.E.2d 839, 841
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (denying summary judgment for defendant in a case where a
Jehovah’s Witness plaintiff “specifically informed defendant that she would consider a
blood transfusion offensive contact”).
172 DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 103, at 95 (AM. LAW INST. 2015)
(noting additionally that “the individual’s right to choose extends even to choices that
reflect unusual subjective preferences and values”).
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perhaps idiosyncratic fragility, they must refrain from
engaging in that intentional touching.173 In the case of food,
this provides another way to establish an offensive touching.
Purchasers of food labeled as kosher, vegetarian, or “all beef”
have identified that they find the inadvertent consumption of
other products offensive. To then intentionally expose the
individual to such touchings is battery.
CONCLUSION
Injured parties currently receive legal redress for
exposure to food that is tainted in the sense of being toxic or
poisonous, but have generally failed to recover in cases
involving offensive taint, where food products contain
substances that are socially, morally, or religiously repugnant
to the consumer. This article argues that these food products
are also “tainted” and cause real dignitary harm, and plaintiffs
who unwillingly consume them deserve legal redress.
The American legal system has long recognized the need
to protect these individual dignitary rights, particularly as
related to personal physical autonomy. Yet facially neutral food
laws and regulations are themselves tainted by embedded food
norms and assumptions. Particularly in a pluralistic society
like the United States where majority norms and values are
pervasive, legislatures must make an effort to protect minority
groups, views, and values in order to strengthen a longstanding
commitment to both legal and social justice. Food is a key
expression of self and belief. People who are in the minority in
American society regarding their beliefs manifest those beliefs
through, among other things, their food choices. Whether
vegetarian, halal, or kosher—they deserve to have the right to
control what they eat and to have their bodies respected,
recognized, and protected under the law. Law must resist the
temptation to taint those values, even through sheer omission,
with a blind commitment to a majority food culture.

173 Id. at 105 (resolving in favor of liability the previously open question of
whether a party who makes contact with a person in a way they know will be offensive
to another’s “abnormally acute sense of personal dignity” has engaged in battery).

